China’s Military Reorganization Keeps Pace With the Times

Original article here.

In a major April 2024 restructuring of its armed forces, China dissolved its Strategic Support Force (SSF), first created in 2015 and that served as the military’s centralized hub for all cyber operations, as well as other capabilities such as psychological warfare and information-enabled activities.  The SSF reported to China’s Central Military Commission and led two branches: the Space Systems Department and the Network Systems Department, according to one study.  Now, China has undergone a major overhaul of its military into what it dubs its “four services and four arms,” which breaks down into the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, as the arms – the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, the Information Support Force, and the Joint Logistics Support Force.  The new reorganization is consistent with China’s continued evolution of its military into a modern force structure with “Chinese characteristics” and one that reflects its perception of the global environment.

With the SSF gone, the new replacement is called the Information Support Force, one of the functional arms of the military.  What’s key to point out is that the ISF is parallel to the Cyberspace Force, showing Beijing’s commitment to acknowledging that information and cyber are related though independent entities, reaffirming Beijing’s longstanding belief data and information are the true drivers for creating a secure environment.  Per the Chinese Defense Minister spokesperson, the Cyberspace Force will be instrumental in shoring up China’s cybersecurity posture, by “promptly detecting and countering” network intrusions while maintaining “national cyber sovereignty.”  The other responsibilities once held by the SSF are assigned to the Aerospace Force and the Information Support Force, a divvying up of mission responsibilities that may have plagued the effectiveness of the former SSF, and made internal components compete for fiscal and material resources.

It has been postulated that several reasons factored into this reorganization and the dissolution of the SSF to include but not limited to:  1.) the SSF’s reliance on leading technology and vulnerability to U.S. efforts to hinder China’s acquisition of it;  2.) Xi’s attempt to curb corruption in the military, as evidenced by the SSF’s former commander’s alleged involvement in procurement fraud; and 3.) Xi’s removal of unnecessary impediments to the Central Military Commission’s ability to directly access tactical components.  While all three may have contributed to the reorganization, a more pressing issue may have been Beijing’s dissatisfaction with how the SSF was either being run or how it was functioning to address Beijing’s strategic priorities.  Since its 2015 inception, alleged Chinese cyber activities have been increasingly exposed with governments like the United States continuously stressing the scope of the Chinese cyber threat, firmly underscored by recent testimonies by U.S. Intelligence Community leaders and the FBI Director.  It begs the question if the SSF was not performing at the level Beijing had hoped.

Though problems and challenges are legitimate reasons to shake up any organization, the creation of “four services and four arms” looks to reflect Beijing’s perception of the changing world, and a response to what it’s biggest adversary (the United States) has been doing.  It’s hard not to look at the Cyber Force and Aerospace Force and not immediately see the similarities to U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Force, two domains increasingly important to project power and influence, and that are ultimately interconnected.  Recently the FBI and U.S. Air Force warned that foreign intelligence agencies see space-related innovation and assets as potential opportunities to obtain vital technologies and as such are seeking to execute cyber attacks against supply chains to facilitate the acquisition.  This further underscores that Beijing understands the convergence of these strategic areas and the need to have dedicated bodies that can collaborate and coordinate rather than compete for funding lines under the same organization.  So, from an organizational perspective, realignment that reduces overlap and limits bureaucratic infighting makes sense.

More importantly, it also demonstrates Beijing’s acknowledgement that the current structure it had in place wasn’t getting the job done with respect to adapting their forces to the “informatization” of modern warfare.  And this is more of a concern, especially given Beijing’s aspirations for Taiwan reunification, a goal that is looking more to be attempted via some level of military interaction at some point in the future.  With likely U.S. intervention, Beijing would be rightfully concerned to possibly to engage with a force that is battle-tested and adept at incorporating the latest technologies.  China knows it’s not at the same level as its principal adversary even when it comes to offensive cyber activities, despite China boasting the reputation of the most pervasive nation state operating in the domain.

Beijing has long believed in the potential of information-based operations as an integral non-lethal means to achieve its goals.  The rapid dismantling of the old SSF after a short stint in favor of creating both an Information Support Force and a Cyber Force is indicative that Beijing is still committed to soft power.  There is necessary harmonization between the two functional areas, which is something that Beijing seems to think is best achieved via separate but parallel bodies in concert with one another to emphasize battle-space information supremacy and integrated joint operations.  News is rife with Chinese cyber operations, its infiltration into critical infrastructure, its global influence operations, and media warfare where it addresses foreign governments claims of Chinese cyber malfeasance.  Coordinating such activities as it tries to become a cyber leader with respect to norms, cyber sovereignty, and standards setting is going to take the Information Support Force and Cyber Force to work seamlessly.

China’s push to change international security in its favor has been captured in its Global Security Initiative (GSI), where topics like sovereignty and noninterference are highlighted as core principles.  Cybersecurity features prominently in the Global Data Security Initiative, a similar effort that focuses on key cyber topics like supply chain security, data security standards, and international cooperation.  Unsurprisingly, there have been supporters and detractors from these projects, but they remain on the forefront of Beijing’s aspirations as both contribute to making China a global influence, if not global leader, in promoting global security.  China’s military reorganization fits into both of these Initiatives by further ensuring that its armed forces are current with the times, continue to informatize on pace with its foreign counterparts, and are able to increase its involvement in peacekeeping missions.

George Washington advocated “peace through strength” and Teddy Roosevelt tweaked this philosophy by acknowledging the need to “speak softly and carry a big stick.”  It appears that China may be taking a page from both presidents.