Report: New Evidence Reveals IDF Had Detailed Prior Knowledge of Hamas Plan to Raid Israel

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A newly surfaced document reveals that Israel Defense Forces and Israeli intelligence systems had detailed knowledge of Hamas’ plan to raid Israel, including the number of hostages to be taken and specific instructions for their treatment while in captivity.

According to a Monday night report presented by Israel’s public broadcaster, Kan, the document, which is based on information from military intelligence’s 8200 Unit, began circulating on September 19, less than three weeks before the October 7 massacre.

The unnamed sources who provided Kan with the document, also claim its contents were brought to the attention of at least some senior intelligence officials but apparently ignored. The memo highlights the extent to which the IDF’s Gaza Division was aware of a potential attack on Israel’s southern border communities.

The document, titled “Detailed End-to-End Raid Training,” goes into startling detail, beginning with a description of a series of exercises conducted by Hamas’ elite Nukhba units in the weeks prior to its publication. “At 11 A.M., several companies were observed converging at the beginning of the training sessions, not before prayer and lunch,” the memo recounts.

“At 12 P.M., equipment and weapons were distributed to the terrorists, and then an exercise of the company’s headquarters took place. At 2 P.M. the raid began.” According to the document, the Nukhba units were given an order that was highlighted: Search the area when you leave and leave no documents behind.

Kan also reported that Hamas commandos practiced infiltrating a mock IDF outpost, simulating bases on the Gaza border. The exercise was carried out by four companies from the terror group, with each assigned a different outpost.

The raid targets described in the document, which include – IDF command and control headquarters, base synagogues, squadron headquarters, communications headquarters and soldiers’ quarters – closely mirror the locations hit by Hamas forces during the early morning hours of October 7.

One of the most shocking sections of the IDF report involves instructions relating to the taking of hostages, the number of which is estimated to be between 200-250, alarmingly close to the actual 251 men, women, and children taken captive by Hamas.

According to the intelligence brief, Hamas terrorists were told to search kidnapped Israelis for telephones, as hostages were forbidden from informing their family’s of their condition, and were ordered to move hostages to a different location if it became apparent that Israel discovered where they were being held captive. They were also told to threaten to kill hostages as a means of deterring escape attempts.

While the document includes never-before-seen details, it is but one in a long list of reports which points to the extent to which military officials were warned of Hamas’ plans to attack Israel.

In July 2023, a Military Intelligence non-commissioned officer (NCO) provided a warning to her commanders that Hamas intended to carry out a massacre in the Gaza border communities.

The NCO wrote three documents in the six months prior to the October 7 attack, in which she warned that Hamas had completed a series of training exercises simulating a raid on kibbutzim and IDF outposts on the Israeli side of the border.

This is in addition to the female observers who, for nearly a year before October 7, reported suspicious activity to their superiors regarding Hamas’ preparations near the border fence, including drone activity, efforts to knock out security cameras, extensive use of vans and motorcycles, and even rehearsals for the shelling of tanks.

Many of the surviving observers have said that their repeated warnings fell on the deaf ears of their commanding officers.

As reported by Kan, the IDF announced earlier this month that in early July it will begin looking into its failures in the lead-up to October 7. According to IDF leadership, the probes will focus on military units deemed to have a role in ignoring Hamas’ preparations and underestimating the group’s ability to carry out a large-scale attack, with a focus on border policies dating all the way back to 2018. Already, a handful of high-ranking officers have announced their plans to resign once the war is over.

While many Israeli citizens and lawmakers have also demanded additional investigations into the political policies that contributed to October 7, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition members have insisted that those investigations wait until the end of the war in Gaza.